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LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SEABED BOUNDARY DELIMITATION IN
THE EAST CHINA SEA. By Ying-jeou Ma, with a Foreword by Louis B.
Sohn. Baltimore, Md.: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary
Asian Studies, Inc., 1984, 308 pp., $15.00.
This volume is, to date, the first monography on seabed boundary de-
limitation in East Asia so comprehensive in coverage and deep in analysis.
The book consists of two parts: Part I, The Setting: The East China Sea Oil
Disputes, and Part II, The Maritime Jurisdictional Disputes: Who May
Own the Undersea Oil? Many of the book's assets make it a valuable con-
tribution to the literature. First, the extensive footnotes reveal the author's
exhaustive research. Second, Professor Ma even devoted a lengthy chapter
(Ch. 6) on the "Relevance of the Peking-Taipei Rivalry: The 'Domestic
Aspect' of the Seabed Dispute," which evidences the author's effort to
"leave no stone unturned." Third, the seven tables and twenty maps in the
appendix, the selected bibliography, and the list of cases are also useful not
only for understanding the arguments the author presents but also as gen-
eral reference.
The completion of Dr. Ma's thesis closely coincided with the adoption
of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It has also been fol-
lowed by the delivery of a series of maritime boundary judgments by the
International Court of Justice. The World Court decided the Libya-Tunisia
case of 19821 prior to the publication of this volume, and the Gulf of Maine
case of 19842 between Canada and the United States shortly afterwards.
Naturally, the author draws extensively from these precedents as well as
from the two earlier cases, namely the North Sea cases of 1969' and the
Anglo-French case of 1977.4 A fifth precedent, namely the Libya-Malta
case of 1985," is too new for the author to have been able to refer to.
The author argues primarily from the standpoint of continental shelf
boundary delimitation. In doing so, he makes a point of basic impor-
tance-that is, the relationship between a continental shelf boundary and
an exclusive economic zone boundary between coastal states, adjacent or
1. Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18
(Judgment of Feb. 24), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 225 (1982).
2. Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can.
v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197 (1984).
3. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judg-
ment of Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 340 (1969).
4. Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 3 (1977), reprinted in 54 I.L.R. 11 (1979) and in 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979).
5. Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 4
(Judgment of June 3), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1189 (1985).
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opposite. This is a point which few other observers of the East China Sea
disputes had discussed even briefly; the general assumption appears to have
been that the two boundaries could not be other than identical. This re-
viewer has once argued that the two boundaries need not always be the
same and that, within the context of the present law of the sea, it is con-
ceivable for the two to be different. The reaction of other observers has
generally been negative.
The author of the present volume concludes (p. 131) that "separate
EEZ and continental shelf boundaries, though difficult to administer, are
not incompatible with the fundamental rationale underlying these two re-
gimes." As a matter of fact, there have already emerged a number of prece-
dents, that is, around Indonesia and between Australia and Papua New
Guinea. In the present issue, therefore, administrative convenience or incon-
venience is irrelevant. The author is right.
With regard to the relevance of the Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku in Japa-
nese) territorial dispute between China and Japan to the East China Sea
maritime boundary disputes, the author comes up with a theory with which
most other observers would seriously disagree. He has been consistently of
the opinion that the territorial issue can be detached from the maritime
boundary issue. In this regard, two points could not be overlooked. First,
China and Japan are involved in other territorial disputes with other coastal
states in the region: China with other coastal states of the South China Sea,
namely with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam over the ownership of
the Paracels and the Spratlys; and Japan with Korea over the Dokto
(Takeshima in Japanese) in the Sea of Japan and with the Soviet Union
over the so-called Northern Four Islands northeast of Hokkaido. This
means that neither China nor Japan could isolate any of the territorial is-
sues for settlement independently of other ones; any particular formula ad-
vantageous to one claimant in one situation could very well prove to be
disadvantageous to it in another.
Second, in East Asia where territories have seldom changed hands
peacefully - perhaps with the exception of the Japan-Imperial Russia
swap of Sakhalin and the Kuriles in 1875 - national sentiments easily
flare up over territorial issues, a fact which the author is sufficiently aware
of. As a result, in East Asia parties to such disputes are extremely cautious
not to do anything ,that might imply a compromise in territorial issues. The
two parties have, in fact, tried to feel out the attitude of each other twice
but their endeavor failed even before they could test the merits of what they
had in mind.6 In brief, a boundary issue could not be settled without first
settling the ownership of what is claimed by both parties. The precedents of
6. Japan Times, Nov. 1, 1979.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
"half-effect" or "full effect" to be given to obscure offshore islands without
physical value merely concern the legal status to be awarded to such is-
lands, not the problems of their territorial ownership. The author's points
are of course well taken, but this would be on the assumption that neither
China nor Japan would insist on using any of the islands in dispute as base-
points for the measurement of their continental shelf or EEZ limit. The
attitude of either party remains to be seen.
Since the author's argument concerns itself with the continental shelf
boundary, it is important to look at the East China Sea disputes with refer-
ence to the EEZ regime. This is essential because of the particular geo-
graphical circumstances of the region. Throughout the entire East China
Sea, nowhere does the distance from one headland or island to another
reach 400 nautical miles. In other words, if all the coastal states come up
with their 200-mile zones, the entire East China Sea falls under the EEZ
jurisdictions of the coastal states. A basic question arises here as to why
any of them would choose to argue over its continental shelf boundary with
the others, because it could claim what it wants under the EEZ regime.
This assumption would presuppose that any of the coastal states would
unlikely be interested solely in the mineral resources at the expense of the
living resources in the superjacent water column. Then a simple question
remains as to why a coastal state would opt for one instead of both. Ulti-
mately, it can be argued that, with the adoption of the 200-mile EEZ re-
gime finally at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982, the basic
issues in the East China Sea disputes were thrown into a new situation
where the applicability of the equidistance rule for the settlement of the
boundary disputes has been greatly enhanced, and on balance, this would
be more in Japan's favor than the other parties'.
In closing, in spite of what has been noted above, this book is indispu-
tably definitive in the literature on this topic, a standing that would not be
affected by a few factual errors. For instance, the Republic of Korea
(ROK) did not sign the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea on
December 10, 1982 (note 21, p. 5), but on March 14, 1983, for reasons not
in need of elaboration here. Also, the Japan-Korea joint development zone
does not lie entirely on the Japanese side of what would be the median-line
between the two parties (ex. pp. 21 and 61); a fraction of it happens to lie
on the other side as well. Australia and Indonesia also renegotiated their
1972 boundary agreement relating the Timor Sea (p. 242), so that the au-
thor's point on it would need to be reviewed.
Choon-ho Park*
* Ph.D. in Public International Law, Edinburgh University; Professor of Law at Korea
University; Director, East Asia Law of the Sea Institute.
19851

